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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this survey is to review some of the most important
cases involving rules and procedures to be followed in courts having appel-
late jurisdiction.' No attempt has been made to cover appellate procedures
in specialized fields such as criminal law2 and workmen's compensation
except as they may relate to general appellate practice. Reference will be
be made to the federal court system when useful analogies can be drawn.
A review of Florida cases over the past two years shows that far too
many appeals were dismissed merely because the procedures outlined in
the Florida Appellate Rules3 were not followed. These Rules are neither
overly complicated nor voluminous. Therefore it is suggested that a re-
view of the Rules would be most beneficial to anyone who is about to take
an appeal.
Because Florida's procedural rules are patterned upon federal rules,
Moore's Federal Practice is today our best text on the state practice.
I. CHANGES IN LEGISLATION AND APPELLATE RULES
The current Florida Appellate Rules were promulgated in 1962.
Rules 1.3, 4 3.2c," 3.2f,' 3.7j, 3.7k, 3.13b,s 3.15b,9 3.16e, ° 4.5c(6) and
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida (retired).
** Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. The survey covers cases reported from 177 So.2d I through 200 So.2d 927.
2. Although cases involving habeas corpus and FLA. R. CRIm. P. 1 are technically classed
as civil actions, they will be treated in the survey on Criminal Law.
3. Sometimes referred to in the text simply as the Rules.
4. The 1965 amendment to the definition of "rendition" clarifies the prior language and
348
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 349
7.2a" were amended by the Supreme Court of Florida in 1965.12
In its last regular session, the 41st Florida Legislature repealed all
statutes relating to time for appeals and substituted in their place the
Florida Appellate Rules.1" This move toward uniformity in the time
allowed for filing an appeal should reduce the risk of overlooking statutes
which shorten the period of time for taking an appeal in certain cases.
On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States promul-
gated an extensive revision of its rules to be effective as of October 2,
1967.1' This was the first major revision of the Court's rules since 1954.
II. JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURTS
A. Supreme Court
Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the Supreme
Court of Florida as a matter of right from final judgments or decrees
passing directly upon the validity of a state statute, a federal statute or
treaty, or construing a controlling provision of the Florida or Federal
Constitution. 15 However, when the trial judge does initially pass on the
validity of a state statute and his holding is neither assigned as error nor
provides that the filing of a timely and proper motion or petition for a new trial, a rehearing,
or other timely post trial motion or petition permitted by the rules stays the "rendition" until
such motion or petition is disposed of.
5. A new paragraph was added which provides:
Deficiencies in form or substance in the notice of appeal shall not be ground for dis-
missal of the appeal unless it be clearly shown that the complaining party was misled
or prejudiced by such deficiencies.
6. The following sentence was added:
Every motion to dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with this rule shall be filed
on or before the 20th day after the filing of the notice of appeal or if costs were set-
tled thereafter from the date of such settlement.
7. The rule was amended to make the appendix requirement to briefs permissive, rather
than mandatory, "despite the mandatory language of the rules in regard thereto."
8. Amended to read that a voluntary dismissal may be by the "moving party" instead
of by the "appellant."
9. The rule now reads:
If a petition for rehearing is filed in a cause, the time for the issuance of the mandate
or other process shall be extended until the petition is denied, or, if granted, until
the cause has been fully determined; provided, however, that the court may delay
the issuance of its mandate upon terms and conditions to be imposed by it after
denial of rehearing for good cause if such application be made at the time of filing
the petition for rehearing.
10. The following sentence was added:
The trial court shall have full and complete power and authority upon due applica-
tion to enforce the payment of fees allowed by the appellate court.
11. The form of the notice of appeal was revised.
12. These amendments are reported at 179 So.2d 341 and at 181 So.2d 2.
13. FLORIDA SEssIoN LAW SERvIcE Ch. 67-175.
14. Thirty-six of the sixty-two rules were amended. The revised rules may be found at
388 U.S. 927, 87 S.Ct. 2147, 18 L.Ed. 2d ii and 42 F.R.D. 81. An excellent discussion of the
effect of these rule changes was written by Bennett Boskey and Eugene Gressman in 42
F.R.D. 139.
15. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
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argued in an appellate brief, there is no jurisdictional vehicle by which the
case can be brought before the supreme court." The supreme court did
take jurisdiction in a case where the trial court unnecessarily held a state
statute invalid and affirmed the decision of the trial court without under-
taking to determine the validity of the statute."
When the language of the trial judge's decree specifically rejects
attacks on the constitutionality of a statute, an appeal may be taken
directly to the supreme court because "passing upon and rejecting attacks
on the validity of an act necessarily involved determination of that
validity1,8
Appeals from district courts of appeal may be taken to the supreme
court only from decisions initially passing upon the validity of a state
statute, a federal statute or treaty; or initially construing a controlling
provision of the Florida or Federal Constitution. 9 A chink was placed in
the armor of this constitutional limitation on jurisdiction by Massachu-
setts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Bryant.2 The supreme court took juris-
diction even though the district court of appeal did not, in fact, initially
pass on the constitutionality of a statute. It had merely discovered an
earlier decision of the supreme court which determined the statute's con-
stitutionality. In clarifying its interpretation of article V, section 4(2) of
the Florida Constitution, the court stated:
Although we have held that a decision 'initially' passing upon
a constitutional question as specified in Section 4 of Article V of
the Constitution, applies only to an original such determination
in immediate litigation . . .we qualified the statement by re-
stricting its application to like decisions by the same or other
District Courts of Appeal. The pronouncement should not be
strained to mean that a litigant could challenge the validity of
an act which had already been held valid by this court and use
that as a vehicle to secure another determination of the issues of
his case under the familiar ruling that once this court assumes
jurisdiction, it will consider the entire case, merits and all. And
to preclude any false hope of litigants and attorneys that such
procedure would be sanctioned, we hasten to say that because of
the ramifications of the present controversy and the many facets
involved we do take jurisdiction, although the ruling of the Dis-
trict Court is based more on 'discovery' than 'initial' deter-
mination .... 21
From the quote above, it would seem that if a district court initially
16. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Walden, 196 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1967).
17. See Conway v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 185 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1966). The court regarded
the opinion of the trial court as obiter dictum.
18. Smith v. Martin, 186 So.2d 16,17 (Fla. 1966).
19. FLA. CowsT. art. V, § 4(2).
20. 189 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1966).
21. Id. at 616.
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passes on the validity of a statute in a particular litigation, and bases its
decision on the discovery of a case decided by a district court of appeal,
an appeal may be taken to the supreme court, and that such an appeal
cannot be taken if the decision of the district court is based on a case de-
cided by the supreme court.
The supreme court may review by certiorari any decision
of a district court of appeal that affects a class of constitutional
or state officers, or that passes upon a question certified by the
district court of appeal to be of great public interest, or that is in
direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal
or of the supreme court on the same point of law, and may issue
writs of certiorari to commissions established by law.2 2
The above-quoted section of the Florida Constitution has been inter-
preted to give the supreme court the jurisdiction to review by certiorari
cases in which the district court has misapplied the rule of an earlier
supreme court decision." It has also been held that obiter dictum is
sufficient to create a conflict in decisions necessary to give the supreme
court jurisdiction to review a case by certiorari. 24
The supreme court has reviewed by certiorari cases in which the dis-
trict court of appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court without
opinion where the legal result of the decision was such that it created an
apparent conflict with an opinion of the supreme court or with a decision
of a different district court of appeal.25 These last-mentioned cases were
not reviewed until after the supreme court requested the district courts to
adopt an opinion setting forth the theory and reasoning upon which the
decisions were based (which requests were refused).2 The fear has been
expressed that, as a result of the decisions to take jurisdiction in such
cases, the lawyers of Florida might never again accept with finality a de-
cision of a district court of appeal.2 7
When an appeal is erroneously taken from a district court of appeal,
the supreme court may treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari if there
22. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(2).
23. See Orange City Water Co. v. Town of Orange City, 188 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1966).
24. See Hawkins v. Williams, 200 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1967) and Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-
Marietta Corp., 197 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
25. See, e.g., Home Dev. Co. v. Bursani, 178 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1965) and Foley v. Weaver
Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
26 In Hoisington v. Kulchin, 178 So.2d 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), the Third District
Court of Appeals refused to set forth an opinion giving the reasoning for it decision.
[T]o comply with the request would be to make an advocate of this court if it
should attempt to set forth the basis of its reasoning after its jurisdiction has ex-
pired. Id. at 352.
It should be pointed out that the supreme court specifically granted jurisdiction to the appel-
late court to set forth its reasoning in an opinion. It is difficult to see why a court should not
advocate a reason for its own decision.
27. See Justice Thornal's dissent in Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221, 234
(Fla. 1965).
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is jurisdiction for granting the petition had it been requested initially.
In Ainsley Realty Co. v. Kramer,28 the district court of appeal dis-
missed the appeal of a corporation against which a final judgment had
been recovered after the corporation had been voluntarily dissolved. The
ground for dismissal was that a dissolved corporation had no standing to
prosecute an appeal. The supreme court pointed out that the appellant
had mistakenly asserted that the district court passed on the validity of a
state statute. However, because the district court overlooked the fact that
the case cited in its order did not support the proposition that an appeal of
a dissolved corporation must be dismissed,29 the supreme court held that
justice required that the appeal be treated as a petition for certiorari. The
court further held that, under section 608.30(3) of the Florida Statutes,
the board of directors of a corporation is allowed to prosecute an appeal
from a final judgment entered against the corporation after its dissolution
when the suit was in progress prior to the dissolution.
The authors would suggest that the holding of Ainsley Realty Co. v.
Kramer be incorporated into the Florida Appellate Rules to read as
follows:
Misconception of Remedy. If an appeal be improvidently taken
where the remedy might have been more properly sought by
certiorari, this alone shall not be a ground for dismissal; but the
notice of appeal and the record thereon shall be regarded and
acted on as a petition for certiorari duly presented.
B. District Courts of Appeal
Article V, section 5(3) of the Florida Constitution states that:
Appeals from trial courts in each appellate district, and from
final orders or decrees of county judge's courts pertaining to
probate matters or to estates and interests of minors and incom-
petents, may be taken to the court of appeal of such district, as
a matter of right, from all final judgments or decrees except
those from which appeals may be taken direct to the supreme
court or to a circuit court.
A district court of appeal may issue writs of man-
damus, certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto, and also all
writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its juris-
diction.
During the period surveyed by this article disagreement arose among
the distirct courts of appeal as to when they have jurisdiction to issue the
writs mentioned in article V. In turning down a request for a writ of pro-
hibition or writ of mandamus the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
28. 189 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1966).
29. The case cited was City of Hollywood v. Bair, 127 Fla. 93, 178 So. 850 (1937).
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trict, interpreted article V to mean that writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, and quo warranto could be issued by the district courts of
appeal only in cases in which a direct appeal to the district court would
be allowed as a matter of right."
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has refused to review,
by certiorari cases in which the Florida Constitution"' confers final appel-
late jurisdiction upon the circuit courts.3 2 However, the other district
courts of appeal have reviewed, by writ of certiorari, cases where direct
appeals were properly taken to circuit courts. a In one of those cases the
court recognized that a party is not entitled to two appeals from the same
judgment, and treated an appeal as a petition for certiorari.3 4 If confusion
does exist as to whether the district courts of appeal have jurisdiction to
review by writ of certiorari a judgment of a circuit court, affirming, modi-
fying or reversing the judgment of a lower court, any doubts should have
been allayed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Dresner
v. City of Tallahassee31 in which the court stated:
The type of certiorari which we here discuss is in the nature
of the common law writ which issues in the sound discretion of
a superior court directed to an inferior court in order to deter-
mine from the face of the record whether the lower court has
exceeded its jurisdiction or has otherwise deviated from the
essential requirements of the law. It is appropriate in situations
where no other provision is made for the review of a judgment
of a lower court.3 6
The extent of this jurisdiction is governed generally by the preced-
ents previously applicable to the Supreme Court of Florida prior to the
establishment of the district courts of appeal.3 7
The constitutional right to appeal the decision of a trial court in a
district "to the court of appeal of such district"3 " was held to give the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, jurisdiction to review the denial
of a petition for certiorari by a circuit court in spite of the fact that a
statute39 "purports to place jurisdiction . . . in the first district court of
30. State ex rel. Sentinel Star Co. v. Lambeth, 192 So.2d 518, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
31. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3).
32. See Berger v. State, 174 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) and State v. Katz, 108 So.2d
60 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
The court did recognize that it could issue a common law writ of certiorari when that
writ is confined to its legitimate scope, but pointed out that the writ could not be used as a
second appeal.
33. See, e.g., Awtrey v. City of St. Petersburg, 193 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) and
Frazee v. Frazee, 185 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
34. Frazee v. Frazee, 185 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
35. 164 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1964).
36. Id. at 210.
37. Id. See also, Robinson v. State, 132 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1961).
38. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 5(3).
39. FLA. STAT. § 458.123(4) (1965).
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appeal. '40 The court reasoned that the certiorari proceeding in the circuit
court, reviewing a decision of the State Board of Medical Examiners, was
an original proceeding or case, and that the jurisdiction thus exercised
was that of a trial court.
C. When Jurisdiction Passes from the Trial Court
It has been a principle of long standing that after an appeal has been
perfected the appellate court has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over
the whole case.4 ' An appellant who files a notice of appeal before the entry
of an order denying his motion for a new trial is deemed to have aban-
doned his motion and thereby vested jurisdiction in the appellate court.42
If a notice of appeal and a motion for a new trial are filed on the same
day, the appellate court is vested with complete and exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties to the appeal.3 Any subsequent
ruling by the trial court on the motion for a new trial is a nullity."
The supreme court departed from the above-mentioned principles of
jurisdiction in State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson45 and held that:
The proper and timely filing of a petition for rehearing
after the filing of a notice of appeal is a subsequent event which
destroys the efficacy of the notice of appeal. Jurisdiction can
thereafter be vested in the appellate court only by the filing of
another notice of appeal following the disposition of the petition
for rehearing or the abandonment of such motion by the party
making it .... 46
The opinion in the above-quoted case gave only a slight hint that the
party seeking a rehearing and the party filing the notice of appeal were
not one and the same.
State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson was later clarified by the supreme
court in Harrell v. State47 in which it was held that, by filing the notice of
appeal the appellant waives his other post trial remedies.
40. Brunson v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 186 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
41. Holland v. State, 15 Fla. 549 (1876).
FLA. App. R. 3.2(d) provides:
The filing of the notice of appeal and deposit of the filing fee with the clerk of the
lower court shall give the [appellate] Court jurisdiction of the subject matter and of
the parties to the appeal....
42. Perez v. City of Tampa, 181 So.2d 571 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
43. State ex rel. Faircloth v. District Court of Appeal, Third District, 187 So.2d 890
(Fla. 1966).
There can be no doubt that the filing of a notice of appeal . .. vests in the ap-
pellate court complete and exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties to the appeal. This court in a number of cases has held that a notice of ap-
peal filed after a motion for a new trial . . . amounted to an abandonment of the
latter. We can draw no distinction because in this case the motion for new trial and
the notice of appeal were filed on the same date. Id. at 891-92 (emphasis supplied).
44. Sanders v. McCaughey, 192 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
45. 156 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1963).
46. Id. at 8.
47. 197 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1967).
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The decision in State ex rel. Owens v. Pearson is based
upon the qualification . . . that the timely post trial motion of
another litigant may operate to render appellant's notice pre-
mature, the doctrine of waiver being clearly inapplicable against
the other party.4"
The doctrine of waiver of post trial remedies should not be confused
with the question of the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Once the
notice of appeal and filing fee are deposited with the clerk of the lower
court, the district court of appeal has "jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties to the appeal."49
The following proposed appellate rules would help to clarify this
point:
An appeal or a petition for writ of certiorari to a lower
court filed within the time fixed by these rules or any applicable
statute is a continuation of the original action which gives the
appellate court jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties.5 °
A timely appeal after the appellant has served a timely
motion tolling the appeal time, deprives the lower court of juris-
diction to determine the merits of the motion.
After a timely appeal a later timely motion by another
which tolls the running of the time for taking an appeal under
these rules does not vitiate the prior appeal, but the lower court
may grant a hearing on the motion and by order tentatively
indicate the tenor of a ruling thereon in event the appellate
court releases jurisdiction for its determination; otherwise, the
appellate court on motion shall release jurisdiction to the lower
court for a hearing and order on the merits of the timely
motion.5
The proper method for a party to obtain a post trial remedy after
another party has properly filed an appeal would be to file a timely
motion with the appellate court requesting that court to grant jurisdic-
tion to the trial court to rule on the motion for a post trial remedy. Such
motions should be freely granted by the appellate courts.
However, under the present Florida precedents, if one party has
48. Id. at 506.
49. FLA. APP. R. 3.2 (d). This rule may be the cause of some confusion because it refers
to "jurisdiction ...of the parties to the appeal." This language could lead one to believe
that the trial court retains jurisdiction over parties who do not file an appeal, but who file a
motion for a post trial remedy subsequent to the filing of an appeal by another party to
the original action.
50. P. BARNS, APPELLATE RULES-PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, Rule 2.2 (Univ. of Miami
Law Center 1967).
51. Id., Rules 5.13(a), (b). Cf. Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1963);
Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 303 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1962).
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filed a timely appeal, the cautious practitioner would be wise to file his
motion for post trial remedy in the trial court, and at the same time
move the appellate court to release jurisdiction to the trial court to rule
on the motion; at least until the present confusion is clarified by a deci-
sion of the supreme court or by an amendment to the rules.
III. TIME FOR FILING APPEALS
A. Premature Filing
Appeals from final decisions, orders, judgments or decrees
shall be commenced within 60 days from the rendition of the
final decision, order, judgment or decree appealed from .... "
'Rendition' of a judgment, decision, order or decree means
that it has been reduced to writing, signed and made a matter of
record, or if recording is not required then filed.53
In Egantoff v. Herring,4 the district court properly held that an
entry of judgment in the circuit court minute book did not commence
the running of the time for taking an appeal because such an entry was
not a rendition of judgment in accordance with Appellate Rules 3.2 (b)
and 1.3. A directed verdict for the defendant had been entered in the
circuit court minute book with the following entry: "It is therefore,
considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that plaintiff . . . do by this
suit take nothing." Sixty-three days later the trial judge signed a formal
judgment. The notice of appeal was filed within sixty days of the signed
judgment of the court but more than sixty days after the minute book
entry. The denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Florida in State ex rel. Herring v. Allen.55
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has used the decisions
in Egantoff v. Herring and State ex rel. Herring v. Allen as authority in
dismissing a great number of cases where appeals were filed after entry
of judgment in the circuit court minute book but before a judgment had
been signed by the trial court.56 In two cases where it was shown on re-
hearing that the trial judge had actually signed the minute book entry,
the appeals were determined on their merits. 7
However, in Mertz & White Inc. v. Mason5" the judge signed the
minute book in order to adjourn the term before the appeal was filed.
52. FLA. Ap. R. 3.2b (emphasis supplied).
53. FLA. Ap. R. 1.3 (emphasis supplied).
54. 177 So.2d 260 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
55. 189 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1966).
56. See, e.g., Hall v. Masucci, 195 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) ; Prevatt v. MeClen-
nan, 194 So.2d 656 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) ; City of St. Petersburg v. Ferguson, 193 So.2d 648
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Allen v. Guagliardo, 189 So.2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
57. Bull v. Roy, 191 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) and Trombley v. Jennings, 189 So.2d
517 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
58. 193 So.2d 654 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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The Second District Court of Appeal held that: "This signature was not
a signature which would make the minute book entry a final judgment." 9
The same court held that the subsequent entry of a cost judgment cannot
make an unsigned entry in a circuit court minute book a final judgment.6 0
In Locke v. Brown,6 the appeal was dismissed ex mero motu as an
appeal from an unsigned minute book entry. Thereafter, the parties per-
fected a formal final judgment and an appeal was brought from that
judgment and heard on the merits. 2
A minute book entry was held appealable in a criminal case even
though not signed by the judge." The court distinguished Egantoff v.
Herring4 by pointing out that in criminal cases Florida Appellate Rule
6.2 requires that appeals be taken within ninety days after judgment is
entered; whereas Florida Appellate Rule 3.2 (b) requires civil appeals to
be taken within sixty days from rendition of judgment. Noting a distinc-
tion made between entry of judgment and rendition of judgment in a law
dictionary,65 the court concluded that a criminal case is appealable from
an unsigned minute book entry.
The Third District Court of Appeal refused to make such a dis-
tinction between entry of judgment and rendition of judgment.6" The
court concluded that "entered" as used in Florida Appellate Rule 6.3 must
be considered the same as "rendition" in Florida Appellate Rule 3.2 (b).
If this were not done the abatement periods provided for in Rule 1.3
(with regard to motions for a new trial) would not be effective for tolling
of the time for taking an appeal in criminal matters.
Obviously an unsigned entry in the circuit court minute book should
not commence the running of time for taking an appeal. The appeal time
should not commence until a formal, final judgment has been "rendered"
or "entered."
To determine when the time for appeal has expired, a definite time
must be established for the commencement of the time. However, this
does not mean that an appeal filed prematurely should be subject to dis-
missal merely because it was filed before judgment was rendered.
In Markham v. Holt,6 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated:
The basic policy considerations underlying the limitation that a
59. Id. at 655. See also, Scaglione v. Best, 196 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
60. Barfield v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 189 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist, 1966).
61. 189 So.2d 833 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
62. Locke v. Brown, 194 So.2d 45 (FIa. 2d Dist. 1967).
63. Gossett v. State, 188 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
64. 177 So.2d 260 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
65. BIAcK's LAw DICoINARY 625 (4th ed. 1951).
66. State v. Shedaker, 190 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
67. 369 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1966).
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final judgment is a prerequisite to appealability are the excessive
inconvenience and costs occasioned by piecemeal review on the
one hand, and the danger of denying justice by needless delay
on the other.68
However, the court went on to hear the case on its merits even though
the appeal was filed before the entry of a judgment. In doing so the court
was following the example of the Supreme Court of the United States
which pointed out in Lemke v. United States 9 that, although the notice
of appeal was filed before judgment was entered, it "gave full notice...
of the sentence and judgment which petitioner challenged." Since the
irregularity did not involve any substantial rights of the parties, it was
disregarded. 7°
The dismissal of appeals from unsigned circuit court minute book
entries can create substantial miscarriages of justice, especially in cases
where such a dismissal occurs more than sixty days after a formal judg-
ment is signed. The right to appeal is then lost.
A remedy for this problem is found in the following proposed amend-
ment to the Florida Appellate Rules:
When an appeal from a judgment is prematurely taken be-
cause the judge has not signed the clerk's minutes, the clerk's
minutes not signed by the judge containing a judgment is suffi-
cient evidence of the rendition and entry of the judgment ap-
pealed from.7'
B. Mistaking Interlocutory Orders as Final
Florida Appellate Rule 4.2 (a) provides in part:
Appeals to district courts from interlocutory orders at law
relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person, appeals to the
appropriate court from interlocutory orders or decrees in equity
and orders, judgments or decrees entered in law or equity after
final judgment or decree, except those relating to motions for
new trial or reconsideration, may be prosecuted in accordance
with this rule ....
At times it is difficult to determine whether an order is interlocutory
or final in nature. In Arnold v. Brady,72 the plaintiff took a full appeal
from the following order:
68. Id. at 942.
69. 346 U.S. 325 (1953).
70. See also, United States v. Kokin, 365 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1966). For a more com-
plete discussion see 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE f 37.05[2] (2d ed. 1965).
71. P. BAsN, APPELLATE RULES-PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, Rule 5.14 (Univ. of Miami
Law 'Center 1967).
72. 178 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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Considered, Ordered and Adjudged that Defendant's Motion for
summary judgment be and the same is hereby granted."3
The appeal was dismissed because it was not from a "final decision, order
or judgment."74 An order granting a motion for summary judgment is
not a summary judgment. Likewise, an order which merely grants a
motion to dismiss a complaint is interlocutory. Adding the words "with
prejudice" does not make it a final order. To constitute a final judgment
the order must go further and dismiss the complaint.75
C. Multi-Claim and Multi-Party Litigation
At common law a writ of error would not lie to bring up a judgment
that had not completely disposed of the action. The reason for that rule
(at least in the year 1615) was that, "the whole record ought to be in the
Common Pleas or in the King's Bench .... ,,76 This rule presented few
problems at a time when there were only a few instances where joinder
of claims or parties was permitted. However, under our present procedure
which permits multiple claims, counterclaims, cross claims, interpleader,
joinder of parties and intervention, judgments may often be entered
which dispose of less than the entire litigation. 77 It is necessary to have
some means of determining when such judgments are final and therefore
appealable. Otherwise there may arise considerable doubt as to when the
time for taking an appeal begins to run; on the other hand, there may be
unnecessary delay in taking an appeal from the portion of the litigation
which has been disposed of.
Several cases reported during the period surveyed point out the need
for having a more definite rule for determining the finality of judgments
in actions involving multiple claims or parties when less than the entire
litigation has been disposed of.
The simplest type of multiple claim litigation is an action based on
a complaint with more than one count. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that when the claims arise out of wholly separate and
distinct transactions or engagements, the dismissal of one count is a final
judgment.78 In Jacobs v. Gould,79 the Second District Court of Appeal
held that an order dismissing with prejudice two counts of a three-count
complaint in an action at law was an interlocutory order. The court failed
to note whether or not the three counts arose out of separate and distinct
transactions.
73. Id.
74. This is but one of many examples in the reported cases where an order granting
a motion was mistaken for a final judgment.
75. Raphael v. Carner, 194 So.2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
76. Metcalfe's Case, 11 Coke 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (1615).
77. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(g), 1.170(a) (b), 1.170(g), 1.240, 1.170(h) and 1.230.
78. Reaves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942).
79. 197 So.2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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Suits involving counterclaims and cross claims may also raise doubts
as to finality when only a portion of the litigation is disposed of. In
Bumby & Stimpson, Inc. v. Peninsula Utilities Corp.,80 the trial court had
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on March 12, 1965,
leaving a compulsory counterclaim still pending. The language of the
judgment was ambiguous as to its finality.8" Notice of appeal was filed
by the plaintiff on April 5. On May 12, the counterclaim was dismissed
without prejudice. On November 2, the Third District Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal because it was filed prior to the rendition of a final
judgment. The court stated: "An order which does not dispose of the
entire claim between the parties is not final." 2 By then it was too late
for the plaintiff to appeal from the final judgment.
The dismissal of a counterclaim was held appealable by the Second
District Court of Appeal in Duncan v. Pullum,"3 where the court stated:
The general rule is that a judgment, order or decree to be
appealable as final must dispose of all the issues or causes in
the case; but the rule is relaxed where the judgment, order or
decree adjudicates a distinct and severable cause of action. This
instant order terminated a separate cause of action, but arising
out of the same subject matter, which defendant thought he had
against plaintiff.84
From the italicized language in the above quote it would appear that the
counterclaim in Duncan v. Pullam would be classified as compulsory
under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to allow an appeal
from the dismissal of a counterclaim when the original claim was still
pending.8" Citing Bumby & Stimpson, Inc. v. Peninsula Utilities Corp.,
the court reasoned as follows:
It has been held that the dismissal of a complaint, although final
in form, which left pending a counterclaim was not appealable.
The same reasoning would apply to an order dismissing a coun-
terclaim.8 6
The court failed to state whether the counterclaim was compulsory or
permissive.
Prior to the adoption of their current rules, the federal courts con-
80. 179 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
81. The order read:
Ordered and adjudged that the motion for summary judgment is granted. The plain-
tiff ... shall take nothing by this suit and the defendant . . . shall go hence without
day, costs to be hereafter taxed. Id. at 415
82. Id. at 416.
83. 198 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
84. Id. at 661 (emphasis supplied).
85. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 189 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
86. Id.
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sidered the dismissal of a permissive counterclaim a final adjudication
whereas the dismissal of a compulsory counterclaim was treated as an
interlocutory order.87
In Hotel Roosevelt Co. v. City of Jacksonville," a full appeal was
allowed from the dismissal of a third party complaint and in Leeward &
Hart Aeronautical Corp. v. South Central Airlines Inc.,8" the same court
allowed a full appeal from the dismissal of a cross claim. In both cases
the dismissals were treated as final adjudications.
Florida has adopted rules of civil procedure which are similar to
federal rules in allowing liberal joinder of claims and parties. However,
the practitioner in state court has no steady guidelines to allow him to
determine the finality of adjudication when only a part of a particular
case is disposed of. A perusal of the cases mentioned in this subsection
will make the point obvious.
If dismissal of part of a litigation is considered as a final adjudica-
tion, then the time for taking an appeal must start running upon such
dismissal. Without guidelines to determine finality of adjudication, the
only safe course is to file an appeal each time a part of the litigation is
concluded and again at the conclusion of the entire litigation.
A guideline could be provided by the adoption of a rule similar to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an ac-
tion, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express de-
termination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the par-
ties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revi-
sion at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
D. Problems Likely to be Caused by the Merger of Law and Equity
In Lehman v. King's, Inc.," the plaintiff brought a suit in equity for
a declaratory decree to construe a lease. The defendant filed a counter-
claim, alleging in count one a claim for breach of contract, and in count
87. 6 J. MooRE, FEnDER. PRACTICE [ 54.23[2] (2d ed. 1966).
88. 192 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
89. 184 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
90. 181 So.2d 228 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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two a claim for punative damages. The trial court granted a motion dis-
missing the claim for punitive damages and an appeal was taken from
that order.
The appellees asserted that the counterclaim stated a common law
action and that an interlocutory order relating to the counterclaim was
not appealable except as to venue or jurisdiction over the person. The
appellate court held that the original suit was brought in equity, and was
therefore controlled by Florida Appellate Rule 4.2 (a).
No distinction is made as to [the] character of equity orders
contemplated, and the rule is meant to encompass all such
orders. . . . The order appealed is one entered pursuant to
equitable proceedings and may therefore be appealed pursuant
to Rule 4.2, subd. a, Fla. App. Rules."
An action which begins as equitable in form is not necessarily to be
treated as equitable throughout its course. 2 If an action contains several
claims for relief, some legal in character and others equitable, then each
order of the court should be examined to see whether it relates to a
"legal" or an "equitable" claim for relief. For purposes of interlocutory
appeals under Rule 4.2(a) those orders relating to "legal" claims for
relief should be treated as interlocutory orders at law.
E. Review of Interlocutory Orders by Certiorari
Interlocutory orders in actions at law
may be reviewed by certiorari under exceptional circumstances,
such as where it clearly appears that the trial court has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or the order does not
comply with the essential requirements of law and may cause
material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which
the remedy by appeal would be inadequate. 3
IV. NOTICE OF APPEAL
Deficiencies in form or substance in the notice of appeal
shall not be jurisdictional and shall not be ground for dismissal
unless it be clearly shown that the complaining party was mis-
led or prejudiced by such deficiencies. 4
Under the above-quoted rule the supreme court reversed the dismis-
sal of an appeal where the notice of appeal erroneously recited that the
91. Id. at 230.
92. Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958).
93. First Nat'l Bank v. J. M. Montgomery Roofing Co., 189 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1966).
94. Fla. App. R. 3.2c.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
order appealed from was recorded in the "Minute Book" instead of the
"Chancery Order Book.'
Another dismissal was reversed in which the notice of appeal er-
roneously stated the date upon which final judgment had been entered. 6
[I]n testing the sufficiency of the notice, the record itself
should be examined. Where the examination of the notice of the
appeal and other appellate documents such as assignments of
error, briefs and other pertinent papers show that the parties
have not been misled or prejudiced by any deficiencies or am-
biguities in the notice itself, the dismissal of such an appeal...
[would be] inconsistent with the concept of our appellate pro-
cedures and the true administration of justice."
The filing of the notice of appeal is the event which fixes all subse-
quent times for performance of acts required in the appellate process
(such as filing assignments of error). The filing of an amended notice of
appeal cannot be the means by which the appellant may alter the time
for performance of acts relating to the appeal" 8
V. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND POINTS ON APPEAL
Florida Appellate Rule 3.5b requires that an appellee file his cross
assignments of error within ten days after the appellant has filed his
assignments of error.
In Florida Board of Pharmacy v. Hall," the district court of appeal,
reversing the trial court, held that the defense of entrapment was not
effective. The appellee advanced other points in support of the trial
court's judgment which the appellate court refused to consider because
the appellee had not made cross assignments of error within ten days
after appellant had filed its assignments of error. In reversing the district
court, the supreme court held that Florida Appellate Rule 3.5b requires
cross assignments of error only when the trial court has made a ruling
adverse to the appellee. The appellee
is not required to file assignments that the lower court has erred
when his position is that the lower court was correct and was not
in error in what it did, even if in error as to its reasoning.'
95. Robbins v. Cipes, 181 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1966).
96. Greyhound Corp. v. Carswell, 181 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1966).
97. Robbins v. Cipes, 181 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1966). See also State ex el. Poe v.
Allen, 196 So.2d 745, 746 (Fla. 1967) in which the court stated:
The signficant factors ... are proper identification of the litigation in the notice,
a clear intent to prosecute an effective appeal, specification of errors reviewable only
upon appeal from the final judgment, presentation of a record sustaining an appeal,
and the absence of any record basis for genuine prejudice as a result of the defective
notice.
98. Laug v. Murphy, 191 So.2d 581 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
99. 157 So.2d 824 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
100. Hall v. Florida Bd. of Pharmacy, 177 So.2d 833, 835 (Fla. 1965).
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As the above-quoted opinion suggests, it is not reasonable to expect
that an appellee will raise suggestions of error to the appellate court when
the trial court has ruled in his favor. However, this view is apparently
not shared by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.,'' the Supreme Court
upheld the power of a court of appeals to order the entry of a judgment
n.o.v. where the appellee suggested no grounds for a new trial in the
event that her judgment was reversed. In her brief to the Supreme Court
the petitioner did suggest a valid ground for a new trial, but the majority
of the Court refused to deviate from the "normal policy" of not con-
sidering issues which have not been presented to the court of appeals.
The majority also emphasized that the appellee had failed to petition
for a rehearing in the court of appeals.
In a vigorous and well reasoned dissent, Mr. Justice Black stated:
[A] court of appeals in reversing a trial court's refusal to
enter judgment n.o.v. on the ground of insufficiency of the evi-
dence is entirely powerless to order the trial court to dismiss the
case, thus depriving the verdict winner of any opportunity to
present a motion for new trial to the trial judge who is thor-
oughly familiar with the case .... [E]ven if a court of appeals
has that power, I find it manifestly unfair to affirm the Court of
Appeals' judgment here without giving this petitioner a chance
to present her grounds for a new trial to the Court of Appeals
as the Court today for the first time holds she must.
1 0 2
The special suitability of having a trial judge decide the
issue of a new trial in cases like this is emphasized by a long
and unbroken line of decisions of this Court holding that exer-
cise of discretion by trial judges in granting or refusing new
trials on factual grounds is practically unreviewable by appel-
late courts.113
Ordinarily a party cannot appeal a judgment in his favor. 10 4 An ex-
ception is made in the instance of a denial of a motion for a new trial
upon the grounds of inadequacy of the verdict. 0 5
In Nasrallah v. Corley,"'0 a final judgment was entered pursuant to
a jury verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff. On appeal the plaintiff
raised three points alleging procedural errors, none of which raised the
question of the trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial based on
101. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
102. Id. at 331.
103. Id. at 337-38.
104. Credit Indus. Co. v. Re-Mark Chem. Co., 67 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1953).
105. Paul v. Kanter, 155 So.2d (Fla. 3 Dist. 1963) (dictum).
106. 180 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
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insufficiency of the verdict. The appellant did assign as error the denial
of his motion for a new trial, but the point was not argued and was there-
fore deemed abandoned." 7 The appeal was quashed.
The correct method to proceed in a case such as Nasrallah would
be to assign the denial of a new trial as error and to argue that a new
trial should have been granted based on procedural errors (such as failure
to admit certain evidence) made during the trial which may have had an
effect on the amount of the verdict.
VI. ACCEPTANCE OF BENEFITS DOCTRINE
It is a well settled doctrine that a party who, voluntarily and know-
ing the facts, accepts the benefits of a judgment is estopped from seek-
ing to have that judgment reversed. His acceptance of payment or en-
forcement of a judgment or decree is a waiver of error'08 (or more prop-
erly, an estoppel from seeking reversal).
The plaintiffs in McDaniel Gift Shop v. Baffee °9 had obtained a writ
of execution and delivered it to the sheriff, but because of defendant's
timely posting of supersedeas bond and the court's stay order the sheriff
neither executed the writ nor levied on the defendant's property. The
"acceptance of benefits doctrine" was not held to apply to the plaintiff's
cross appeal because the plaintiffs had received nothing of value.
A modification of the "acceptance of benefits doctrine" in cases
involving an order or decree awarding separate maintenance, support or
alimony is found in Florida Appellate Rule 3.8(b).
VII. BRIEFS
The Florida Appellate Rules do not authorize an appellee to file a
reply brief and as a general rule such a brief will be striken on motion."'
VIII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A trial court does not have jurisdiction to fix attorney's fees for
appellate services."' An attorney who fails to file a motion for fees in
accordance with Florida Appellate Rule 3.16e waives his right to appel-
late fees." 2 Appellate fees must be requested "by motion filed with the
clerk of the appellate court at or before the time of filing the party's
first brief .... ""113
107. Fla. App. R. 3.7i.
108. Sedgwick v. Shaw, 188 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
109. 179 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
110. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hill, 198 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
111. See FLA. App. R. 3.16e; Howell v. Howell, 183 So.2d 261 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966);
Anderson v. Anderson, 180 So.2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). But cf. Salonan v. Saloman, 186
So.2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
112. Cf. Poling v. City Bank & Trust Co., 189 So.2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
113. FLA. Ap. R. 3.16e.
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When the notice of appeal is filed more than sixty days after final
judgment the appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal with
respect to the issues finally adjudicated. However, the court can hear the
issue of sufficiency of attorney's fees fixed by an order entered less than
sixty days before the notice of appeal was filed."14
IX. SUPERSEDEAS
Even though a final decree which is being appealed contains provi-
sions rendering it in part other than a money judgment, if it nonetheless
contains a judgment for the recovery of money not otherwise secured,
it may be superseded only by compliance with Appellate Rule 5.7.115
114. Lovett v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 187 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
115. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1965).
